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Abstract. This paper concerns the application of formal methods to
the definition of a detect and avoid concept for unmanned aircraft sys-
tems (UAS). In particular, it illustrates how formal analysis was used to
explain and correct unexpected behaviors of the logic that issues alerts
when two aircraft are predicted not to be well clear from one another.
As a result of this analysis, a recommendation was proposed to, and
subsequently adopted by, the US standards organization that defines the
minimum operational requirements for the UAS detect and avoid con-
cept.
1 Introduction
One of the major challenges to the integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(UAS) into the NAS (National Aerospace System) is the lack of an on-board
pilot to comply with US and international legal requirements [5, 8]. In manned
aircraft operations, on-board pilots have the responsibility for not “operating an
aircraft so close to another aircraft as to create a collision hazard”, “to see and
avoid other aircraft”, and when complying with the particular rules addressing
right-of-way, on-board pilots “may not pass over, under, or ahead [of the right-
of-way aircraft] unless well clear”. To address the safety challenge and establish
parallel requirements for UAS, the final report of the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA) Sense and Avoid (SAA) Workshop [3] defined the concept of
sense and avoid as “the capability of a UAS to remain well clear from and avoid
collisions with other airborne traffic.” This concept, which is now called detect
and avoid, has been proposed as a means of compliance with the preceding legal
requirements.
In 2013, the RTCA organization established the Special Committee (SC)
228 to provide technical guidance to the FAA for defining minimum operational
performance standards for the UAS detect and avoid concept, based on a quan-
titative definition of the well-clear boundary. The well-clear boundary adopted
by RTCA SC-228 is defined by a Boolean formula based on the Resolution Ad-
visory (RA) detection logic of the second generation of the Traffic Alerting and
Collision Avoidance System (TCAS II) [2]. To accommodate sensor uncertainty
and other conditions, the detect and avoid concept considered by RTCA SC-228
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allows for the use of extended well-clear boundaries in the logic that issues alerts
when aircraft are predicted to lose well-clear status. This paper presents a for-
malization of extended well-clear boundaries and the verification of their main
properties. In particular, it presents a novel result that explains and corrects a
potentially unsafe property of extended well-clear boundaries when their thresh-
old parameters are not properly set. The formal analysis presented in this paper
resulted in a recommendation to RTCA SC-228 that has been adopted in the
current draft of the Minimum Operational Requirements Standards (MOPS) for
UAS.
The mathematical development in this paper has been conducted in the Pro-
totype Verification System (PVS) [7]. For readability, this paper uses mathe-
matical notation instead of concrete PVS syntax. For further information on
this formal development, the reader is referred to the directory WellClear in
the NASA PVS Library.1
2 Well-Clear Boundary and Its Extensions
This paper considers two aircraft, called ownship and intruder, whose states are
given by position and velocity vectors in a local East, North, Up (ENU) Cartesian
coordinate system. Since it is notationally convenient, horizontal and vertical
components of a three-dimensional vector are represented by a two-dimensional
vector and a scalar, respectively, and these components are presented in a relative
coordinate system where the intruder is at the origin and the ownship moves
relative to the intruder.
The set of relative aircraft states that are in well-clear violation, i.e., inside
the well-clear boundary, is defined as follows.
WCV(s, sz,v, vz) ≡ HWCV(s,v) ∧VWCV(sz, vz), (1)
where s,v ∈ R2 are the respective relative horizontal position and velocity vec-
tors of the aircraft, and sz, vz ∈ R are the respective relative vertical positions
and velocities. Informally, a well-clear violation, characterized by the predicate
WCV, occurs when the aircraft are in horizontal violation, characterized by
the predicate HWCV, and in vertical violation, characterized by the predicate
VWCV. The horizontal and vertical violation predicates are defined as follows.
HWCV(s,v) ≡ ‖s‖ ≤ DMOD ∨ (HMDF(s,v) ∧ 0 ≤ τmod(s,v) ≤ TAUMOD), (2)
VWCV(sz, vz) ≡ |sz| ≤ ZTHR ∨ 0 ≤ tcoa(sz, vz) ≤ TCOA, (3)
where TAUMOD and DMOD are horizontal time and distance thresholds, respec-
tively, and TCOA and ZTHR are vertical time and distance thresholds, respectively.
The predicate HMDF is called the horizontal miss-distance filter and is defined
as HMDF(s,v) ≡ dcpa(s,v) ≤ HMD, where HMD is the horizontal miss-distance
threshold and is usually set to the same value as DMOD. The distance function
1 https://github.com/nasa/pvslib.
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dcpa computes the projected horizontal distance of the aircraft at their closest
point of approach, assuming constant relative horizontal velocity, v, and is for-
mally defined as dcpa(s,v) ≡ ‖s+ tcpa(s,v)v‖. The time function tcpa is the time
to closest point of approach, which is defined as tcpa(s,v) ≡ − s·vv2 , when ‖v‖ 6= 0,
and 0 otherwise. The time function τmod, called modified tau, was introduced in
the TCAS II RA logic [4]. In the vector notation used in this paper, modified
tau is defined as τmod(s,v) ≡ DMOD2−s2s·v , when s ·v < 0, and -1 otherwise. The time
function tcoa computes the time to co-altitude assuming constant relative vertical
speed vz. It is defined as tcoa(sz, vz) ≡ − szvz , when szvz < 0, and -1 otherwise.
The conditions s · v < 0 and szvz < 0 hold when the aircraft are horizontally
converging and vertically converging, respectively.
For arbitrary values of DMOD, ZTHR, TAUMOD, and TCOA, with HMD = DMOD,
Formula (1) satisfies several operational requirements [6]. The values of these
thresholds recommended by the UAS SARP [2] and adopted by the RTCA SC-
228 are DMOD = HMD = 4000ft, ZTHR = 450ft, TAUMOD = 35s, and TCOA = 0s. These
values were chosen using a collision-risk analysis and acceptability metrics aimed
to defining a well-clear boundary that is large enough to avoid safety concerns
for controllers and see-and-avoid pilots, but small enough to avoid disruptions to
traffic flow [1]. Furthermore, the detect and avoid concept considered by RTCA
SC-228 only applies to certain types of UAS and in classes of airspace that are
usually below 10,000 ft, that is, Class D, Class E, and perhaps Class G airspace.
The well-clear boundary defined by Formula (1) assumes perfect aircraft state
information. To accomodate for uncertainty in the position and velocity informa-
tion, the RTCA SC-228 requirements for the well-clear alerting logic allows for
the use of a larger set of threshold values within some ranges. An extended well-
clear boundary is characterized by a predicate WCV∗ defined by Formula (1), but
using parameters DMOD∗ ≥ DMOD, HMD∗ ≥ HMD, ZTHR∗ ≥ ZTHR, TAUMOD∗ ≥ TAUMOD,
and TCOA∗ ≥ TCOA. The following property, which is proven in PVS, guaran-
tees that the well-clear boundary, instantiated with standard threshold values,
is safely included in any of its extensions.
Theorem 1 (Extension). WCV is included in WCV∗, i.e., for all relative
states s, sz,v, vz, WCV(s, sz,v, vz) =⇒ WCV∗(s, sz,v, vz).
3 An Unexpected Result When HMD∗ > DMOD∗
In flight simulations at NASA, an unexpected behavior was observed in the
alerting logic. In some converging, non-maneuvering encounters (i.e., aircraft
flying converging straight line trajectories), alerts due to predicted violation of
an extended well-clear boundary suddenly disappear before the closest-point of
approach. This behavior was originally blamed on a possible coding error. To
understand the actual explanation of this behavior, it is necessary to review the
origins of the τmod function and the horizontal-miss distance filter in the TCAS II
RA detection logic.
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The definition of the UAS well-clear boundary in Section 2 closely follows
the detection logic of the TCAS II RA algorithm.2 However, while Formula (1)
assumes state information in vector form, which is readily available through
modern global positioning systems such as GPS, the family of TCAS devices
assumes that aircraft are equipped with active transponders, which provide less
precise aircraft state information. Earlier versions of the TCAS alerting logic
used a simpler variant of Formula (2): ‖s‖ ≤ DMOD ∨ 0 ≤ τ(s,v) ≤ TAUMOD,
where τ is defined as range over closure rate or, in vector form, − s2s·v when
s · v < 0 and −1 otherwise.
Two problems may arise with use of the simpler variant of Formula (2).
The first problem involves encounters with low closure rates. It holds that τ
tends to positive infinity as the aircraft reach the closest point of approach,
which is attained when the closure rate is 0, i.e., when s · v = 0. TCAS II
addresses this problem by using a modified version of τ , i.e., τmod. Both τmod
and τ are approximations of time to closest point of approach, tcpa. Indeed, it
has been formally proven that for horizontally converging trajectories whose
initial states are outside DMOD, i.e., s · v < 0, ‖s‖ > DMOD, and dcpa(s,v) ≤ DMOD,
τmod(s,v) ≤ tcpa(s,v) ≤ τ(s,v) [6]. In contrast to tcpa, the computations of τ and
τmod can be done without directional information. The second problem involves
high closure rates with large miss distances, which creates a high rate of false RA
alerts. TCAS II addresses this problem by employing a horizontal miss distance
filter [4]. The idea behind the filter is to stop RA issuances when the projected
future distance at the closest point of approach will be greater than a given
distance HMD. In TCAS II, the value HMD is set to be equal to DMOD. The actual
horizontal miss-distance filter in TCAS II employs a sophisticated parabolic
range tracker to provide projected range, range rate, and range acceleration.
Depending on the quality of the range rate estimate computed by the tracker and
other conditions, the TCAS II RA system may disable the use of the horizontal
miss distance filter. This is in contrast to the well-clear boundary definition where
the horizontal miss-distance filter is never disabled. This may cause situations
where aircraft are inside the TCAS II RA boundary, but not inside the well-clear
boundary. Hence, in the case of the UAS detect and avoid concept, it is tempting
to mitigate this problem by using an alerting logic with an extended well-clear
boundary where HMD∗ > DMOD∗.
One key property that can affect the properties of an extended well-clear
boundary is whether τmod, as a function of time for a straight line relative tra-
jectory, i.e., τmod : t→ τmod(s+ tv,v), is monotonically decreasing before closest
point of approach. The following lemma, which is proven in PVS, provides a
necessary and sufficient condition for the function τmod to be monotonically de-
creasing for straight line trajectories.
Lemma 1. The function τmod is monotonically decreasing for straight line tra-
jectories if and only if ‖s+ tv‖ ≤ DMOD∗ for some time t.
2 The TCAS II RA logic uses TAUMOD instead of TCOA in the vertical dimension.
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Consider an extended well-clear boundary where HMD∗ ≤ DMOD∗. Note that
this is actually the case in the current version of the TCAS II RA logic, where
HMD∗ is equal to DMOD∗. If there is an alert, then there must be some t where
‖s+tv‖ ≤ HMD∗ ≤ DMOD∗. By Lemma 1, this means that τmod is always decreasing.
Its graph is shaped as in Figure 1. In this case, the following theorem, which is
proven in PVS, holds.
Theorem 2 (Convergence). An extended well-clear boundary where HMD∗ ≤
DMOD∗ is convergent, i.e., for all relative states s, sz,v, vz, with s·v ≤ 0, szvz ≤ 0,
and either vz = 0 or sz 6= 0, if WCV∗(s, sz,v, vz) then for all 0 ≤ t ≤ t∗,
WCV∗(s+ tv, sz + tvz,v, vz), where t∗ is tcpa(s,v) if vz = 0, tcoa(sz, vz) if v = 0,
and, in any other case, min(tcpa(s,v), tcoa(sz, vz)).
The convergence property guarantees that, in a non-maneuvering encounter, a
violation of an extended well-clear boundary, where HMD∗ ≤ DMOD∗, never disap-
pears before closest point of approach.
On the other hand, when HMD∗ > DMOD∗, there are cases where ‖s + tv‖ >
DMOD∗ for every possible value of t but where ‖s+ tv‖ < HMD∗ for some t. Thus,
there is some time region where τmod is increasing. In fact, just before closest
point of approach, the numerator of τmod is negative and its denominator is both
negative and approaching negative infinity. This case is illustrated in Figure 2.
This observation leads to the following theorem, which is also proven in PVS.
Theorem 3. If HMD∗ > DMOD∗, then there exist relative vectors s,v such that
dcpa(s,v) < HMD
∗, s · v < 0, and dcpa(s,v) > DMOD∗. In these situations, the
value of τmod(t) tends to positive infinity as the aircraft reach the closest point of
approach.
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Fig. 1. Case HMD∗ ≤ DMOD∗
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Fig. 2. Case HMD∗ > DMOD∗
From an operational point of view, a negative consequence of Theorem 3
is that in a non-maneuvering encounter where HMD∗ > DMOD∗, a violation of an
extended well-clear boundary may disappear before the aircraft have reached the
closest point of approach. In this case, an alerting logic that protects against such
an extended well-clear boundary may unexpectedly stop issuing alerts before the
aircraft reach the closest point of approach.
5
4 Conclusion
This paper reported on the application of formal methods, in particular interac-
tive theorem proving in PVS, to the analysis of extended well-clear boundaries
based on the TCAS II alerting logic. In particular, it has been formally proven
that an extended well-clear boundary is convergent if HMD∗ ≤ DMOD∗. Further-
more, the analysis explains why, when HMD∗ > DMOD∗, an alerting logic that
protects against such an extended boundary may stop issuing alerts before the
aircraft reach the closest point of approach. To the knowledge of the authors,
there has been no prior report and explanation of this result. As result of this
analysis, the authors recommended to RTCA SC-228 that when an extended
well-clear boundary is used by a detect and avoid algorithm, the value of HMD∗
is set to DMOD∗ (the case HMD∗ < DMOD∗ is not operationally interesting). This
recommendation has been accepted and is part of the current draft of the RTCA
SC-228 MOPS for UAS.
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